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Abstract
Between 1978 and 2003 the Chinese economy experienced a remarkable 5.7 percent
annual growth of GDP per labor. At the same time, there has been a noticeable
transformation of the economy: the share of workers in agriculture decreased from over
70 percent to less than 50 percent. We distinguish three sectors: private agriculture
and nonagriculture and public nonagriculture. A growth accounting exercise reveals
that the main source of growth was TFP in the private nonagricultural sector. The
reallocation of labor from agriculture to nonagriculture accounted for 1.9 percent out
of the 5.7 percent growth in output per labor. The reallocation of labor from the
public to the private sector also accounted for a signiﬁcant part of growth in the 1996-
2003 period. We calibrate a general equilibrium model where the driving forces are
public investment and employment, as well as sectorial TFP derived from our growth
accounting exercise. The model tracks the historical employment share of agriculture
and the labor productivities of all three sectors quite well.
Keywords: China, structural transformation, growth.
JEL Classiﬁcation Nos: O41, O53.
1 Introduction
Between 1978 and 2003, the Chinese economy experienced a real annual rate of total
GDP growth of 8.4 percent, a performance that makes China the most rapidly growing
economy in the world during this period. Labor productivity grew during this period at a
remarkable 5.7 percent per year. At the same time, there has been a sharp transformation
of the Chinese economy, as millions of workers left the agricultural sector, to join the
industrial sector, reducing the share of workers in agriculture from over 70 percent of all
workers in 1978, to under 50 percent in 2003. What are the driving forces of this rapid
growth and structural transformation of the Chinese economy? In this paper, we develop
∗Xiaowen Zhang provided exceptional research assistance. Conversations with Carsten Holtz, Yong Kim,
Sam Kortum, Justin Lin, Tom Rawski, John Strauss, and Guofu Tan are deeply appreciated.
1a quantitative, general equilibrium growth model to try to capture China’s recent growth
and structural transformation. We use this model to project the likely path of China’s
future growth, and the role the transfer of labor from agriculture to nonagriculture will
play in this growth.
Our model has three sectors, the agricultural sector, the nonagricultural private sector,
and the nonagricultural public (government) sector. The agricultural and the nonagri-
cultural private sectors are proﬁt maximizing; but we leave the objective of the Chinese
public sector unspeciﬁed; the public sector simply extracts labor and capital from the rest
of the economy. China is nominally still a socialist economy. At the beginning of our pe-
riod, 1978, the public sector produced nearly all of nonagricultural output. Even in 1990,
public sector output was over 90 percent of nonagricultural output. Thus, for China, it is
important to model the public sector explicitly.
Technological progress is exogenous in all three sectors, but is highest in the nona-
gricultural private sector. We show in the analysis of our model that the expansion of
the nonagricultural public sector–which occurred in China from the late-1970s to the mid-
1990s–will draw labor out of agriculture. We also show that the more rapid technological
progress in the private nonagriculture sector will draw labor out of agriculture. A rise in
private nonagricultural productivity will tend to lower the relative price of nonagricultural
goods, raising the demand for labor in private nonagriculture, at the expense of labor in
agriculture. Using plausible parameter values, we simulate our model and ﬁnd that the
model tracks the historical employment share of agriculture, and the labor productivities
of all three sector remarkably well. Thus, the two main driving forces for China’s structural
transformation– or the decline in the agricultural share of employment–are the expansion
of the nonagricultural public sector; and especially since the mid-1990s, the rapid techno-
logical progress in the private nonagricultural sector.
Although many descriptive accounts of China’s structural transformation exist, to the
best of our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst quantitative growth model of the Chinese
economy from 1978 to 2003. The only other related paper that we know of that analytically
tries to explain China’s structural transformation is Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu (2005). As
in this paper, Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu attribute the structural transformation of China
mainly to technological progress, although the details of their model diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from ours. Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu do not examine the role of the Chinese public sector in
the country’s structural transformation, nor do they simulate their model to see how well
their model tracks China’s historical experience.
Another contribution of this paper is the development of a consistent set of Chinese
accounts for the agricultural sector, and for the public and private nonagricultural sectors,
that enables us to compare our growth model with the data. In a well-known paper, Young
(2003) has showed by adjusting the Chinese national accounts, that labor productivity
2in the national accounts is signiﬁcantly overestimated for the nonagricultural sector. We
apply Young’s methodology separately to the agricultural sector, and to the nonagricultural
sector disaggregated into the public and private spheres.
We perform a growth accounting exercise using our adjusted national accounts data.
Among the interesting ﬁndings is that between 1978 and 2003, annual total factor pro-
ductivity growth in the public sector was essentially zero, while that in the private sector
was over 7 percent. Between 1978 and 2003, out of total labor productivity growth of 5.7
percent, the contribution of structural transformation, or the reallocation of labor from
agriculture to nonagriculture was a respectable 1.9 percent. However, the contribution
of this labor reallocation declined over time, and was only 0.2 percent out of 5.8 percent
between 1996 and 2003. During this latter period, the contribution of private sector pro-
ductivity growth surged to 2.7 percent, and the contribution of the reallocation of labor
from the public to the private sphere rose to 1.0 percent. Thus, presently, and probably
into the future, the drivers of Chinese total GDP and labor productivity growth will be
the shrinkage of the ineﬃcient public (government) sector; and particularly, technological
progress in the private sector.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, we describe the Chinese data,
and how we adjust the data. To obtain sectorial total factor productivity growth estimates,
we measure the growth in sectorial labor, human capital, physical capital, and the levels
of sectorial land, capital, and labor shares. Using our adjusted data, we then conduct two
growth accounting exercises. First, we decompose the growth of total output in each sector
into the contributions of labor, human capital, physical capital, and total factor productiv-
ity growth. Second, we decompose the growth of aggregate labor productivity (output per
labor) into the contributions of agricultural labor productivity growth, the reallocation of
labor from agriculture to nonagriculture; private and public nonagricultural labor produc-
tivity growth, and the reallocation of labor from the public to the private nonagricultural
sector. In Section 3, we develop our model economy, and analyze its properties. In Section
4, we calibrate our model to reasonable parameter values and compare the model with
patterns in the Chinese data. In Section 5, we use our model, and our long-run projections
of the exogenous variables for the Chinese economy, to conduct forecasting experiments.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Data
All data cited in this Section, unless otherwise noted, are from the annual issues of the
Chinese Statistical Yearbook (CSY), issued by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB). Views
among Chinese economy specialists diﬀer as to the reliability of Chinese oﬃcial economic
statistics. Young (2003) and Rawski (2004) argue that GDP (output) growth is systemat-
3ically overstated by the oﬃcial statistics, while investment is understated. Chow (1993),
on the other hand, argues that Chinese oﬃcial statistics are on the whole reliable. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to judge these arguments regarding the accuracy of Chinese
oﬃcial statistics. In general, we accept the Chinese oﬃcial statistics, making adjustments
only in cases when the deﬁciencies of the commonly used measures (such as in GDP and
in investment) are well known.
For our purposes, the main challenge is to classify the Chinese data into our three
sectors of interest: the agricultural sector, the nonagricultural public sector, and the nona-
gricultural private sector. The agricultural sector is deﬁned as the primary industry, which
includes forestry, livestock, and ﬁshing. The nonagricultural sector is deﬁned as the sum
of the secondary and tertiary industries. In the nonagricultural public sector, we include
State-owned enterprises, Collective and Cooperative units, and Township and Village en-
terprises (TVEs). The nonagricultural private sector includes all other types of ﬁrms,
including Private enterprises, Self-employed workers, and ﬁrms with foreign investment.
Unlike in capitalist economies, in China, there are conceptual diﬃculties in classifying
ﬁrms into the public and private sectors. In particular, Township and Village enterprises—
the largest employer in China since the early 1990s (about 135 million workers)–are owned
and operated by local governments. Much has been made about how these TVEs owned
by local governments actually operate like private corporations. Although China’s local
governments may try to operate a miniature state-run economy, ultimately each local
producer is subjected to competition from thousands of other villages. In this competitive
environment, each local government faces a relatively hard budget constraint; and has to
make its own enterprise economically successful (Naughton, 2005). On the other hand,
local governments do serve as guarantors of TVE borrowing. If that is the case, then
capital allocation decisions by TVEs are not determined entirely by the market. In fact,
continued government interference, and corruption are described as disadvantages of local
government ownership. These disadvantages of local government ownership seem to have
worsened since the mid-1990s, as employment and proﬁtability in the TVEs have declined
(Naughton, 2005). While acknowledging that the TVEs may be subject to some market
forces, we classify TVEs as belonging to the public sector, since ultimately, the (local)
government decides how much labor and capital that these ﬁrms employ.
In fact, even in ﬁrms with corporate forms that we classify as belonging to the private
sector–such as limited liability and shareholding corporations–the government often owns
signiﬁcant equity stakes. When a State-owned enterprise is privatized, the privatized enter-
prise often takes the form of a limited liability or shareholding corporation. The corporate
boards of these ﬁrms are often dominated by government oﬃcials. Thus, the government
may exercise signiﬁcant legal control over the investment and employment decisions of even
4these privatized enterprises (OECD, 2005).1
2.1 Employment by Sector
Total employment in State-owned enterprises, Collective and Cooperative units, TVEs,
Private and other ﬁrms, and the Self-employed are given in the CSY. The CSY also gives
the number of employees in each of these sectors that work in agriculture, so we can
net out agricultural employment from total employment; and calculate the number of
nonagricultural workers in public and private enterprises.2
Figure 1 depicts the shares of employment, since 1978. Particularly noteworthy is the
decline in the relative share of agricultural employment from 70 percent of all workers in
1978 to less than 50 percent of all workers in 2003.3 The share of workers in private industry
has increased from a negligible level in the mid-1980s to approach about 25 percent of all
workers in 2003. The share of workers in public industry, while increasing until the mid-
1990s, declined sharply since the late 1990s, as State enterprises and TVEs were privatized.
2.2 Prices and GDP by Sector
We follow Young’s (2003) methodology by deﬂating the nominal GDPs reported in the
CSY not by their GDP deﬂators, but by other survey based price indices, reported in the
CSY. We deﬂate primary sector nominal GDP by the general price index of farm products.
We deﬂate secondary sector nominal GDP by the ex-factory industrial price index. We
deﬂate tertiary sector nominal GDP by the service price index.
Figure 2 depicts the ratio of the general price index of farm products (“agricultural
prices”) to the industrial price index (“industry prices”). For “industry prices,” we take
the weighted average of the ex-factory industrial price index and the service price index,
where the weights are the nonagricultural GDP shares of the secondary and tertiary sectors.
1Although China bans the direct involvement or participation of government oﬃcials in any commercial
activities, in reality many government oﬃcials and their relatives invest in private enterprises.
Also, because of the lack of strong legal protection of private property, private enterprises often have
to seek this protection from local government oﬃcials. With this protection, private enterprise can more
easily obtain loans from banks. Naturally, this means that there is some meddling in the aﬀairs of private
enterprises by government oﬃcials (Asian Development Bank, 2003).
2Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu (BHZ, 2005) suggest that the number of agricultural workers reported in
the CSY is upward biased, because the CSY assumes that all rural workers are employed in agriculture,
when in fact, some rural workers are self-employed or employed in rural industry. BHZ subtract from
the total number of agricultural workers, the number of rural workers involved in self-employment and in
private enterprises. BHZ’s procedure, however, may understate the number of agricultural workers, to the
extent that many rural workers have dual jobs, in both agriculture and nonagriculture. Because of the
inherent diﬃculty in classifying rural workers, here we take ”as is” the CSY classiﬁcation of agricultural
and nonagricultural workers.
3In late 2005, the output of the service sector was revised upwards, reﬂecting the growth in law and
consulting ﬁrms, retail stores, health clubs, and the like. Most of this output is believed to be generated
by private ﬁrms, especially individual proprietors. Our estimates of employment do not capture this latest
revision in the growth of the nonagricultural sector (Manchester Guardian, 2005).
5The ratio of agricultural prices to industry prices increased until the late 1980s, and then
declined by about 60 percent from then on to return to the 1978 level.
China’s agricultural prices have been gradually liberalized from government control
since the early 1980s. In the early 1980s, to increase incentives to farmers, China’s leaders
sharply increased the procurement prices of agricultural goods (McMillan, Whalley, and
Zhu, 1989; Huang, Otsuka, and Rozelle, 2004). Since then, the government has periodically
intervened through procurement plans at least until the early 1990s. Thus, only from about
the early 1990s are Chinese agricultural prices largely determined by the market. We can
see from Figure 2 that the ratio of agricultural to industry prices has generally declined
from 1990, when agricultural prices became more market determined.
On the other hand, Brandt, Hsieh, and Zhu (2005) argue that the decline in the relative
price of agriculture since 1990 is overstated in the data as depicted in Figure 2. This is
because the service price index used to construct the price index for nonagricultural or
industry prices is likely to overestimate the actual price increases in the services sector,
owing to rapid structural shifts in the Chinese economy from personal to business services.
The authors construct an alternative price index for services, and show that by using this
new service price index, the ratio of agricultural to industry prices from 1990 is essentially
ﬂat. Given the inherent data problems in measuring the change in service prices in China,
we are agnostic about the whether the ratio of agricultural prices to industry prices is
falling or relatively ﬂat from the 1990s.
The CSY does not break down GDP, a value added measure, into the public and
private sectors for our entire sample period.4 However, it breaks down nonagricultural
gross output into the State-owned, Collective, Cooperative, TVE, and the Private sectors;
so that nonagricultural gross output can be allocated to each of these sectors. We make
the assumption that the share of intermediate inputs is the same in all sectors; so that the
ratio of net to gross outputs are the same.5 We then simply allocate total nonagricultural
GDP to the public and private sectors; according to the allocation of gross outputs.
Figure 3 depicts the growth in total output, and its breakdown from 1978 to 2003.
While growing strongly since 1978, total output growth stalled in the late 1980s. In 1989,
total output fell by over 5 percent. Young (2003) correlates the late 1980s slowdown in total
output growth to the student uprisings in Tiananmen Square. Total output growth has
been especially strong since 1999, growing at over 9 percent, even according to our lower
revised growth rates (compared to the oﬃcial growth rates). Particularly noteworthy is
the sharp increase in the share of the output of private industry since the mid-1990s.
4In late 2005, Chinese growth rates from 1995 to 2004 were revised upwards because of the increased
estimated output in some private sector tertiary (service) industries, such as in law and advertising (Manch-
ester Guardian, 2005). Our data do not reﬂect these recent upward revisions in the shares of the service
sector.
5This is not a bad assumption; especially after 2000, where we have data on GDPs for both State-owned
and Private ﬁrms. In 2002, the ratios of GDP to gross output were about 0.70 in both sectors.
6Figure 4 depicts the trends in labor productivity. The data on private industry labor
productivity are rather volatile, jumping in 1986, and ﬂuctuating sharply between 1990
and 1997. This may be a result of poor sectorial output data; or that in earlier years, the
share of private industry was small in China, so that the privatization of some huge State
enterprises may have lead to large changes in average private industry labor productivity.
We thus put more credence on the long-run trends in Chinese labor productivity, than on
the year-to-year ﬂuctuations.
Average aggregate labor productivity (output per labor) in our revised data grew at
5.7 percent per annum between 1978 to 2003. Average agricultural labor productivity
grew at 4.5 percent per year, from 300 yuan per worker in 1978 to 1100 yuan per worker
in 2003. Average nonagricultural (industry) labor productivity grew at 4.1 percent, from
2200 yuan per worker in 1978 to 5900 yuan per worker in 2003, with annual public and
private industry labor productivity growing at 2.6 percent and 7.5 percent, respectively.
We can determine the contribution of agricultural and nonagricultural labor productiv-
ity to the growth in aggregate GDP per worker by performing a simple accounting exercise.
Of the 5.7 percent per annum growth in aggregate GDP per worker productivity, the con-
tribution of agricultural labor productivity growth was 0.8 percent, and the contribution of
nonagricultural labor productivity growth was 3.0 percent.6 The remainder–1.9 percent–is
the contribution of the reallocation of labor, from the low labor productivity agricultural
sector to the high labor productivity nonagricultural sector.
Agricultural labor productivity, while growing three-fold since 1978, even now (in 2003)
is only about 1/6 of average nonagricultural labor productivity. This suggests that the
scope of raising the aggregate productivity of labor by transferring low productivity agri-
cultural workers to the high productivity nonagricultural sector remains large.
2.3 Capital and Land by Sector
Total gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF) is obtained from the CSY. The published
Chinese national accounts do not provide information on the sectorial distribution of GFCF,
but the provincial accounts do. For the period 1978-95, Hsueh and Li (1999) report the
sectorial distribution of GFCF in 26 provinces (all provinces other than Jianxi, Guangdong,
Hainan, and Tibet), accounting for an average of 78 percent of the annual value of national
GFCF. For the remaining period 1996-2003, we obtain the distributional gross ﬁxed capital
formation data from the individual Provincial Statistical Yearbooks, and aggregate across
the provinces. We use the sectorial distribution reported in Hsueh and Li (1999) and in the
Provincial Statistical Yearbooks to allocate overall national gross capital formation between
the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of the economy.
6The contribution of the primary and nonprimary sectors are measured by the growth of labor produc-
tivity in each sector, weighted by their respective shares of GDP.
7The CSY provides additional data on ﬁxed investment by ownership (State, TVEs,
Collective, private, etc.) in the nonagricultural sector. This additional data is compiled
from enterprise surveys; and its magnitude is about 10 percent higher than the national
income account gross ﬁxed capital formation data, from at least the late 1990s. The cover-
age of ﬁxed investment in these enterprise surveys seems quite comprehensive, and includes
investment in capital construction, research and development, real estate development, and
in other areas. We assume that the discrepancy between the ﬁxed investment data and the
national income accounts gross capital formation data are identical across sectors; and use
the sectorial distribution in the data on ﬁxed investment to allocate nonagricultural gross
capital formation between the public and private sectors of the nonagricultural economy.
To obtain our real investment ﬁgures, we must deﬂate our nominal investment ﬁgures.
Between 1978 and 1998, we deﬂate our measures of nominal sectorial investment with
Young’s (2003, Figure 5) alternative deﬂator for gross ﬁxed capital formation. Between
1999 and 2003, we construct our own alternative deﬂator, following the method of Young
(2003). With our measures of real sectorial investment from 1978 to 2003 in hand, we
can calculate the capital stock using the perpetual inventory method and a 5 percent
depreciation rate (as in Young (2003)). We obtain the starting stock of capital at the end
of 1978 from Chow (1993).
Figure 5 depicts the capital-output ratios for the economy, and by sector. The capital-
output ratio for the entire economy has remained constant at about 4 since 1978. That
capital deepening has not occurred for China in the post-reform period is well known
(Young, 2003). The capital-output ratio of public industry has risen since the mid-1990s,
reﬂecting the low productivity of capital in State enterprises and in the TVEs in recent
years. In contrast, the capital-output ratio of private industry is falling, reﬂecting the
higher eﬃciency of capital in private industry.
Figure 6 depicts the investment shares of the agricultural, public and private industrial
sectors. The investment share of the agricultural sector has declined at a gradual pace.
Since the early 1990s, the investment share of public industry has sharply declined; while
that for private industry has sharply increased. These trends reﬂect the growth of private
industry, and the relative decline of public industry. However, the level of the capital
stock in public industry has continued to rise, as evidenced by the recent decline of the
capital-output ratio in that industry.
Finally, while we assume that labor and capital are the only two inputs in the nona-
gricultural sector, we allow land inputs in the agricultural sector. We measure total land
inputs by the total sown area of farm crops in China (as in McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu,
1989). These data are available in the CSY. The total sown area of farm crops has re-
mained essentially ﬁxed, growing at an annualized rate of 0.06 percent between 1978 and
2003.
82.4 Growth in Human Capital by Sector
A proper measure of the growth of labor input should account for diﬀerences in the human
capital of the workforce. For example, suppose that overall labor services are a constant
returns to scale function of N types of labor:
L = H(L1,L2,...LN),
Diﬀerentiating, the growth of overall labor services is a weighted average of the growth











where the human capital weight Hi is revealed by the wage of worker of type i.The
diﬀerence between dL
L and the growth of overall labor undiﬀerentiated by type can be taken
as the contribution of ”human capital.”
While the CSY provides a reasonable measure of the overall growth of the labor force,
and its sectorial distribution, it does not contain any information about the characteristics
of workers, such as sector, age, and education needed in the calculation of Li. To adjust
for the changing characteristics of workers, we must use Chinese census and survey data.
We obtain the number of workers by sector, age and education from the 1987 Tabulation of
China’s 1% Population Sample Survey and the 2000 Population Census of China. (Pub-
lished Chinese census data prior to 1987 do not provide education levels broken down by
age.) We classify workers into 11 age, 4 education, and 2 sector (agriculture, nonagricul-
ture) categories to obtain a total of 88 characteristics. By taking the annualized growth
rate in the number of workers of characteristic i between 1987 and 2000, we can obtain the
growth rate of workers of characteristic i, dLi
Li .
These growth rates must weighted by Hi, or by wages. Predicted wages of workers of
characteristic i are obtained in the usual way from estimated Mincer equations for Chi-
nese workers. We calculate the growth in human capital separately for the agricultural
and nonagricultural sectors. For nonagricultural workers, we use the Mincer equation es-
timated by Young using Chinese household level data (2003, Table 17). Reliable estimates
of Mincer equations for Chinese agricultural workers do not exist. This is because Chi-
nese farms are generally operated by families–not paid workers–who subsist by keeping a
portion of agricultural proceeds, according to the household responsibility system (Huang,
Otsuka, and Rozelle, 2004). Thus, for the predicted wages of those employed in the Chi-
nese agricultural sector, we use Mincer equations estimated for employees in Chinese rural
industry, on the assumption that on the margin, the wages of employees in rural industry
should capture the marginal revenue product of Chinese agricultural workers. For these
9employees in rural industry, we use the Mincer equation estimated by Zhang, Huang, and
Rozelle (2002). The estimated returns to education for employees in Chinese rural indus-
try are considerably lower than the returns to education for the general sample of Chinese
nonagricultural workers.
We subtract from our calculated dL
L for the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors,
the growth in the overall labor forces in these sectors between 1987 and 2000, to arrive at
annualized growth rates of human capital of 1.4 percent in nonagriculture, and 1.1 percent
in agriculture. Given the lack of appropriate Chinese census data spanning other periods,
we assume that these growth rates hold on average for the entire period 1978 to 2003.
Since we do not have the characteristics of workers by type of nonagricultural industry, we
assume identical growth rates of human capital for both the public and private sectors of
Chinese industry.
2.5 Factor Income Shares by Sector
In China, the ratio of compensation by employees to GDP can be estimated using data
from the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks or from the input-output tables. Young (2003,
Table 21) ﬁnds that on average between 1978 and 1995, the labor share of output for the
nonagricultural sector was 0.46 using both the provincial or the input-output data. There
is clearly an upward trend in the labor share; in the provincial data, it rose from 0.42
in 1978 to 0.53 in 1995. We obtained the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks from 1996 to
2003, and calculated nonagricultural labor shares across Chinese provinces for each year.
Between 1996 and 2003, the labor share averaged 0.54. Thus, for the entire period, 1978
to 2003, the nonagricultural labor share averaged 0.46. We assume identical labor shares
for the public and private Chinese nonagricultural industries.
Using the provincial data assembled by Hsueh and Li (1999) between 1978 and 1995;
and the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks from 1996 to 2003, we ﬁnd that the average labor
share in agriculture was 0.76 for the period 1978 to 2003. This is higher than the 0.53
found by Hayami and Ruttan (1985), using Chinese data in the pre-reform (1978) period;
but similar to the 0.70 labor share used in McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu (1989). Hayami
and Ruttan (1985) ﬁnd that the capital share is twice as high as the land share. Chow
(1993) estimates a production function for the Chinese agricultural sector using data from
1952 to 1988 and ﬁnds that the labor, capital, and land shares are 0.40, 0.25, and 0.35,
respectively. Both Hayami and Ruttan (1985) and Chow (1993) include data from the
pre-reform (1978) period. It is hard to interpret factor shares based on a period when
the economy was centrally planned. Because of the lack of reliable data, here we assume
identical capital and land shares in agriculture, 0.12. Changing the capital and land shares
to 0.16 and 0.08 only negligibly aﬀects our estimates of agricultural total factor productivity
growth.
102.6 Total Factor Productivity Growth by Sector
Table 1 summarizes our accounting of Chinese economic growth from 1978 to 2003. Total













where wk is the capital share, wLis the labor share, and wTis the land share. We have
shown above that the capital share is 0.12 for agriculture, and 0.54 for nonagriculture; the
labor share is 0.76 for agriculture, and 0.46 for nonagriculture; and the land share is 0.12
for agriculture.
Table 1: Accounting for Total Factor Productivity Growth
(1978-2003; in percent per annum)
Aggregate Agriculture Nonagriculture Public Private
Output 8.4 5.6 9.1 5.2 24.2
Labor 2.5 1.0 4.8 2.5 15.5
Human Capital — 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4
Physical Capital — 3.5 8.1 6.5 16.8
Agricultural Land — 0.06 — — —
Total Factor Productivity — 3.5 1.9 -0.05 7.3
Output per Labor 5.7 4.5 4.1 2.6 7.5
Output per Labor (Level)
(in 100s of 1978 yuan)
1978 9 3 22 22 13
2003 35 11 59 42 80
We estimate that total factor productivity growth in Chinese agriculture averaged 3.5
percent per annum between 1978 and 2003. McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu (1989) estimate
that for the 1978 to 1984 period, total factor productivity growth in Chinese agriculture
averaged almost 6 percent. However, this earlier period was marked by enormous increases
in agricultural productivity, owing to the introduction of the household responsibility sys-
tem and administrated increases in agricultural prices, which sharply raised incentives for
farming. For the more recent period of 1979 to 1997, Fan and Zhang (2002) ﬁnd that
total factor productivity growth in Chinese agriculture was 3.3 percent per annum, which
is close to our estimate.
We estimate that TFP growth in the Chinese nonagricultural sector averaged 1.9 per-
cent per annum between 1978 and 2003. Since our methodology for adjusting Chinese
11statistics follows Young (2003), our estimate of nonagricultural total factor productivity
growth is close to the 1.4 per annum Young found between 1978 and 1998. Our estimate
is somewhat higher than Young’s estimate, since Chinese nonagricultural TFP accelerated
between 1999 and 2003. Using unadjusted data from the Chinese national accounts, Li
(2003) ﬁnds TFP growth of 3.2 per annum between 1978 and 1998. This higher estimate
shows that the use of unadjusted Chinese national accounts data–by overestimating GDP
growth and underestimating investment–may result in very high TFP estimates.
We ﬁnd essentially zero, or slightly negative TFP growth in public nonagricultural
industries. The ﬁnding of negative or very small productivity growth in Chinese state
industries is consistent with Jeﬀerson, Rawski, and Zheng (1989), and the OECD (2005).
In particular, the OECD (2005) uses a large scale ﬁrm level survey conducted by the
Chinese government; and ﬁnds that from 1998 to 2003, private ﬁrms had TFP growth rates
between 121 percent and 46 percent higher than ﬁrms with varying degrees of state control.
However, our deﬁnition of public industries include Township and Village Enterprises and
other collectives, in addition to State-owned enterprises. As expected and consistent with
the OECD’s (2005) ﬁrm level ﬁndings, TFP growth rates in Chinese private nonagricultural
industries are very high.
2.7 Role of the Reallocation of Labor, or of ”Structural Transformation”
We can further examine the role of the reallocation of labor in accounting for Chinese
growth. The growth in total output can be broken down into the growth of labor sup-
ply; and the growth in aggregate labor productivity (output per labor). The growth in
aggregate labor productivity–in turn–can be broken down into the contribution of agri-
cultural labor productivity, of nonagricultural labor productivity; and of the reallocation
of labor from low productivity agriculture to high productivity nonagriculture. The con-
tributions of the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors are measured by the growth of
labor productivity in each sector, weighted by their respective shares of output. Finally,
the contribution of the reallocation of labor is equal to the growth in nonagriculture’s share
of total employment weighted by the gap in labor productivity between the two sectors,
measured as a percentage of aggregate labor productivity.
Of the 8.4 percent growth in aggregate output, the growth in labor productivity con-
tributed 5.7 percent between 1978 and 2003. Of this 5.7 percent, the growth in agricul-
tural labor productivity contributed 0.8 percent; and the growth in nonagricultural labor
productivity contributed 3.0 percent. The reallocation of labor from agriculture to nona-
griculture contributed 1.9 percent to aggregate and per capita output growth, owing to the
low productivity level of agricultural labor, compared to nonagricultural labor.
12Table 2: Role of the Reallocation of Labor
(1978-2003; in percent per annum)
1978-2003 1978-1995 1996-2003
Output Growth 8.4 8.5 6.8
Labor Growth 2.5 3.2 0.9
Output per Labor (Labor Productivity) Growth 5.7 5.2 5.8
Contribution of Agricultural Labor Productivity Growth 0.8 0.7 0.8
Contribution of Nonagricultural Labor Productivity Growth 3.0 2.4 4.7
Of Which:
Contribution of Public Sector Productivity Growth 1.7 1.6 1.0
Contribution of Private Sector Productivity Growth 1.0 0.6 2.7
Labor Reallocation from Public to Private Sector 0.5 0.3 1.0
Labor Reallocation from Agriculture to Nonagriculture 1.9 2.0 0.2
The role of the reallocation of labor from agriculture to nonagriculture in accounting
for overall growth has declined over time. While this reallocation contributed 2.0 percent
between 1978 and 1995, it contributed only negligibly (0.2 percent) between 1996 and
2003. On the other hand, the contribution of nonagricultural labor productivity growth
has increased sharply, from 2.4 percent in 1978-1995 to 4.7 percent in 1996-2003.
The contribution of nonagricultural labor productivity growth can be further broken
down into the contribution of public sector labor productivity growth, of private sector
labor productivity growth, and the reallocation of labor from the public to the private
sector. The contribution of public sector productivity growth has fallen from 1.6 percent
in 1978-1995 to 1.0 percent in 1996-2003. In contrast, the contribution of private sector
productivity growth increased from 0.6 percent in 1978-1995 to 2.7 percent in 1996-2003.
The contribution of the remainder–the reallocation of labor from the public sector to the
higher productivity private sector–contributed 1.0 percent to both aggregate productivity
growth and aggregate output growth. Thus, since the mid-1990s, Chinese aggregate pro-
ductivity and output growth seem to be driven largely by high productivity growth in the
private sector, and the reallocation of labor from the public to the private sector.
3 The Model Economy
3.1 Environment
Consider an economy where time is discrete and indexed by t = 1,...,+∞. There is a
measure 1 of identical, inﬁnitely-lived households, endowed with 1 unit of productive time
each period. Households have preferences deﬁned over two goods: An agricultural good
called a and a nonagricultural (manufacturing and service) good called m. The latter is
13the num´ eraire. The price of good a is denoted by pt. It is produced by the agricultural
sector with the services of labor, capital and land. The stock of productive land, l, is
ﬁxed and owned by households. (In the data, the agricultural land area is virtually ﬁxed,
increasing by a total of less than 1.5 percent in 25 years.) The nonagricultural good is
produced by two diﬀerent entities: a private nonagricultural sector and a public sector run
by the government. Both use capital and labor to produce m. The private sector rents
labor, capital and land from households. Capital depreciates at rate δ and the interest rate
between period t−1 and t is denoted by rt. The rental rate of capital is then rt +δ. Land
is assumed to not depreciate. Its price during period t is denoted by qt and its rental rate
between period t − 1 and t by it. The wage rate during period t is wt.
The government is also a producer of good m. It has access to the same technology as
the private nonagricultural sector, but its total factor productivity can be lower to capture
the idea that government’s businesses tend to be less eﬃcient than private businesses. How
does the government acquires the resources (i.e., capital and labor) needed to operate the
nonagricultural technology? It is assumed that it hires labor and pays the market wage,
but it does not rent capital. Instead, it accumulates capital through lump-sum taxation,
τt. It does not maximize any objective function: instead, public employment and the level
of taxation (i.e., the level of public investment) are determined exogenously and constitute
policy variables. The revenue, after paying public workers, is rebated to households as a
lump-sum transfer, Tt.
3.2 Households




where cjt is consumption of good j (j = a,m) during period t. The momentary utility
function is deﬁned by
U (cm,ca) = ln
h
ωc(ε−1)/ε
m + (1 − ω)c(ε−1)/ε
a
iε/(ε−1)
, with ε > 0.
The parameter ε represents the elasticity of substitution between cm and ca. The repre-







s.t. cmt + ptcat + st+1 + τt = wt + (1 + rt)st + Tt (1)
k0 given.
14The variable st+1 represents savings of the households during period t. They consist in
capital and land: st+1 = kt+1 +qtl. In equilibrium, land and capital oﬀer the same return,
i.e., (it + qt)/qt−1 = 1 + rt. Thus, the return on saving is 1 + rt.
3.3 Private ﬁrms
In the private nonagricultural sector, the technology is given by
ymt = Fm (kmt,nmt) = zmtkα
mtn1−α
mt , α ∈ (0,1)
In the agricultural sector it is
yat = Fa (kat,nat,l) = zatkθ
atn
µ
atl1−θ−µ, θ,µ ∈ (0,1), θ + µ ∈ (0,1).
The variables njt and kjt (j = a,m) represent, respectively, the fraction of workers in sector
i and the capital stock. Total factor productivity can diﬀer across sectors and is given by
zjt. The nonagricultural sector solves
max
kmt,nmt
{Fm (kmt,nmt) − wtnmt − (rt + δ)kmt} (2)
and the agricultural sector solves:
max
kat,nat,l
{ptFa (kat,nat,l) − wtnat − (rt + δ)kat − itl}. (3)
Deﬁne private capital kt by kt = kat + kmt.
3.4 Public sector
The public sector is characterized by a sequence {ngt,kgt}
∞
t=0 of public employment and
capital. Public capital accumulates through
kgt+1 = (1 − δ)kgt + xgt
where xgt, the level of net public investment, is entirely ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes:
xgt = τt.





15Its budget constraint is
wtngt + Tt + kgt+1 = ygt + τt + (1 − δ)kgt.
In words, public expenditures consist of wage payments, transfer payments and the pur-
chase of capital used in the public sector. Public resources are the sum of public production,
tax revenue and the value of undepreciated public capital. Since all capital accumulation
is ﬁnanced through taxes, this constraint also writes as
Tt = ygt − wtngt
that is, the government uses its revenue, net of wage payments, to ﬁnance transfers to the
households.
Deﬁnition: Competitive Equilibrium
Given government’s policies {ngt,kgt}
∞






1. Given prices, the sequence {cmt,cat,kt+1}
∞
t=0 solves problem (1);
2. Given prices, the sequence {kmt,nmt}
∞
t=0 solves problem (2);
3. Given prices, the sequence {kat,nat,l}
∞
t=0 solves problem (3);
4. Markets clear:
(a) The market for a clears: cat = yat;
(b) The market for m clears: cmt + kt+1 + τt = ymt + ygt + (1 − δ)kt;
(c) The labor market clears: nat + nmt + ngt = 1.
3.5 Analysis
Before we move to the quantitative implications of our model, to ﬁx our intuition, here we
analyze the eﬀect of the various driving forces on the agricultural share of employment.
The eﬀect of the driving forces at work in the model can be analyzed by investigating its
steady state.
Proposition 1 In a steady state, the Equilibrium of the model economy is characterized












where A,B and C are positive constant, depending on the parameters of the model and
G = yg − δkg.
16Proof. See Appendix.
Equation (4) is the market clearing condition for good m where each variable is ex-
pressed as a function of na. The right-hand side of (4) is an aﬃne function of na with a
negative slope and a positive intercept. The left-hand side is increasing through the origin.
Observe that when ε < 1, the coeﬃcient on na is less than 1. When ε > 1, this coeﬃcient
is larger than 1. In the case where ε = 1, or if there were no decreasing returns (or no land)
in agriculture, the right-hand side would be a linear function of na. The determination of
na in (a steady state) equilibrium is represented in Figure 7.
Equation (4) reveals that the elasticity of substitution between the two goods is a critical
variable of the model. When the goods are substitutes, i.e., when ε > 1, the left-hand side
of (4) is decreasing in za and increasing in zm, while the opposite is true when ε < 1, that
is when the goods are complements. Thus, the direction of the eﬀect of zm and za on the
sectorial allocation of labor depends on ε. The mechanism behind this is as follows: When
goods are substitutes, a change in the relative price (resulting from changes in zm and/or
za) leads to an increase in the demand of the cheaper good and a decrease in the demand
of the other one. As a result, labor reallocates to the sector experiencing an increase in
demand. When the goods are complements, however, a decrease in the relative price leads
to an increase in the demand for both goods. To meet this demand, labor reallocates to
the sector experiencing the slower growth in productivity. In what follows, the case where
ε > 1 is analyzed since, in Section 4, ε is calibrated to a value larger than one.
Productivity growth in agriculture – Suppose that there is an increase in total factor
productivity in agriculture, za. When the goods are substitutes, an increase in za reduces
the slope of the left-hand side of (4) which creates an increase in na. This is represented
in Figure 8.
Productivity growth in private nonagriculture – Now suppose that there is an increase in
zm. There are two eﬀects. The ﬁrst one parallels the impact of an increase in agricultural
TFP but, here, draws labor out of agriculture. The second eﬀect is linked to the existence of
the government, which is another producer of good m. An increase in zm makes the private
sector relatively more eﬃcient than the public sector, and promotes a reallocation of labor
toward the private sector’s producing m. Observe that this second mechanism operates
regardless of the value of ε, but is reinforced, when ε > 1, by the fact that consumption of
good a decreases (the ﬁrst eﬀect). The decline in na is depicted in Figure 9.
Increase in public nonagricultural production – The public sector enters the right-hand
side of Equation (4) through its eﬀect on the intercept. The term G = yg −δkg is the part
of the total consumption of m which is satisﬁed by public production. One cannot say, a
priori, whether an increase in kg raises or reduces G. At a suﬃciently high level of public
capital accumulation, the marginal product of capital is low enough so that an increase
in kg decreases G. In such case, the employment share in agriculture decreases. This is
17represented in Figure 10. The eﬀect of a increase in public employment, ng, is ambiguous
for similar reasons: On the one hand, it raises the public production of m. On the other
hand, less labor is available for working in the private sector producing either m or a.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this Section, we will examine if our model is capable of replicating some stylized patterns
in the post-reform Chinese economy. Can the model capture the changes in employment
shares between agriculture and nonagriculture? How about the changing levels of labor
productivity (output per labor) in the three sectors? The nature of the computational
experiment is as follows. Suppose ﬁrst that preference and technology parameters are
given. The exogenous driving forces of the economy are productivity paths {zmt,zat,zgt}
and paths for the policy variables, {kgt,ngt}. Imagine starting the economy oﬀ at date
t = 1, corresponding to 1978, when the levels of productivity and public policy are given by
zm1, za1, zg1, kg1 and nm1. Given a path for the exogenous driving forces, one can compute
the equilibrium trajectory of the economy, and assess the extent to which the mechanisms
embedded into the model can account for the transition experienced by China.
To build the path of exogenous variables, proceed as follows. First, the government’s
actual share of total employment in the data (see Figure 1) is used for ngt. Second, in
the data the stock of capital owned by the government increases at an annual rate of 6.5%
between 1978 and 2003 (see Table 1). Given an initial capital stock kg1, the path for kgt is
built as:
kgt = kg1e0.065(t−1).
The productivity paths {zmt,zat,zgt} are assumed to grow at constant rates γm, γa and
γg respectively:
zjt = zj1eγjt, j = m,a,g.
The γjs are derived from the information provided in Table 1 regarding the growth in Total
Factor Productivity and human capital. Namely
γm = 0.073 + (1 − α) × 0.014,
γa = 0.035 + µ × 0.035,
γg = −0.005 + (1 − α) × 0.014.
Factor shares α, µ and θ were discussed in Section 2.6. The annual depreciation rate is set
to 5%, the discount factor β to 1/1.07 = 0.93.
The initial values zm1,za1,zg1 and kg1 are chosen so that the model displays reasonable
results along the following dimension: (i) The level of output per labor in the manufacturing
sector in 1978 is the highest in the public sector, above that of the private nonagricultural
18sector. Output per labor is the lowest in the agriculture sector (see Table 1); (ii) by 2003,
the ranking of output per labor is diﬀerent, the agricultural sector still is the lowest, but
the private nonagriculture sector is the highest (see Table 1); (iii) The employment share
in agriculture declines from 70% to 49%; (iv) The public share of total investment declines
from 79% to 52%; (v) The relative price of agricultural goods declines. The calibrated
values of the parameters are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Calibration
Preferences β = 0.93,ω = 0.20,ε = 2.0
Technology α = 0.54,θ = 0.12,µ = 0.76,δ = 0.05
Driving variables zm1 = 1.5,γm = 0.079
za1 = 5.0,γa = 0.061
zg1 = 1.4,γg = 0.011
kg1 = 50,kgt = kg1e0.065(t−1)
{ngt} actual data
Figures 11–14 display the simulated paths for the employment share in agriculture,
output per labor in each sector, the public share of total investment, and the relative
price of agricultural goods. Under this calibration, the model generates a transition of the
labor force out of agriculture and towards private nonagriculture. This trend generated
by the model economy matches well the level and pace of its empirical counterpart. The
patterns of output per labor are also in line with the data in the sense that the ranking and
relative pace of sectorial output per labor are consistent. Namely, the agricultural sector
is uniformly below the rest of the economy and output per labor grows at the fastest rate
in the private nonagricultural sector.
Private investment, in the model economy, grows fast enough so that the share of public
investment in total investment is decreasing at a pace that mimics its empirical counterpart.
In this respect, the calibration captures the relative disengagement of the state from the
economy, and its eﬀect on the sectorial allocation of labor. Finally, the model generates
a decline in the relative price of agricultural goods.7However, this decline is more gradual
than the decline in the relative price of agricultural goods after the early 1990s, as observed
in the data.
7Note that the (model) relative price plotted in Figure 15 is not pt. The model’s couterpart to the
relative price observe in the data is not the price of a in terms of m, but in terms of a bundle of goods.
Thus, the relative price of a, plotted in Figure 15, is ptcat/(cmt + ptcat).
195 Projections of Future Sectorial Labor Productivities and
the Allocation of Labor
5.1 Future Path of Exogenous Variables
We use our model economy developed above to project the future path of Chinese growth
in output per labor, and of the country’s reallocation of labor, from the agricultural to
the nonagricultural sector, and from the public to the private sector. To do this, we must
specify the future growth path of the exogenous variables. The exogenous variables in our
model are total labor supply, human capital, public employment, public capital; and TFP
growth in the agricultural sector, and in the public and private nonagricultural sectors.
Table 4 summarizes our assumptions concerning the growth rates of these variables.
Table 4: Long-run Projections of Exogenous Variables
(growth in percent per annum)
The Exogenous Variable Long-run Growth
Labor 0.3
Public Employment (Share) 1) 28 percent of total employment
2) 5 percent of total employment by 2050
Public Capital Changes to keep capital-labor ratio









Macrochina, a Chinese government research institute aﬃliated with the State Develop-
ment Committee, projects that the Chinese total labor force will grow at an average annual
rate of about 0.3 percent until 2050. The Macrochina projection is more optimistic than
the United Nations population projection for China, which predicts a declining working
age population (falling at an annual rate of 0.4 percent until 2050). The United Nations
projection assumes that China will continue with the current, general “one-child” policy,
while the Macrochina projection assumes a partial discontinuation of the “one-child” pol-
icy. (There is a government proposal pending to allow all Chinese couples each of whom
is a single child to have two children.) We adopt the more optimistic Macrochina (2006)
projection.
20The Chinese government does not release ﬁgures for the future pace of privatization
of public enterprises. Between 1996 and 2003, the number of workers in public industry
decreased by an average of 3.5 percent per year. The government’s 11th ﬁve-year plan,
adopted in March 2006, highlighted the need for continued reform of State-owned enter-
prises. The plan stated that except for a very few ﬁrms key to national security or welfare,
State- and Collective-owned enterprises should generally be at least partially privatized.
On the other hand, there have been recent calls by some Hong Kong-based economists that
the pace of privatization has been too rapid, leading to income inequality and corruption
(RIETI, 2004). These calls for a slowdown in privatization appears to have gained some
traction in the last few years. Since it is diﬃcult to gauge the Chinese government’s priva-
tization plans, we perform our projections under two scenarios. One, we assume that the
government keeps the public employment share constant at the 2003 level of 28 percent.
Two, we assume that the government reduces the public employment share to 15 percent
by 2010, and to 5 percent by 2050. We also assume that public capital grows at a rate to
keep constant, the public sector capital-labor ratio, under the two scenarios.
In terms of purchasing power parity, China’s current per capita income, at $3750,
is about equal to Japan’s per capita income in 1960, its closest industrialized country
neighbor. In our projections, we will illustrate what would happen to China’s economy if
its education levels and productivity growth rates converged to Japan’s current (year 2000)
values in about 40 to 50 years. While the share of Chinese employees with a secondary
education is high, the share of employees with a college education is much lower in China
than in Japan. In 2000, the average years of education for the working age population in
Japan was 12.4, while in China, it was 10.4. Since typically, the returns to education is
about 0.07 for education beyond the secondary level, for Chinese education levels to catch
up to Japanese levels in about 40 years, human capital will have to grow at about 0.5
percent per year.
Over the long-run (in 40 to 50 years), we assume that Chinese total factor productivity
growth rates in the agricultural and in private nonagricultural industries will gradually
converge to industrialized country TFP growth rates, as typiﬁed by Japan. Jorgenson and
Nomura (2005) estimate that annual Japanese TFP growth rates over the long-run (1960-
2000) averaged 0.70 percent in agriculture; and 1.4 percent in nonagriculture. We take
these TFP growth rates as the long-run Chinese TFP growth rates for the agricultural and
nonagricultural private sectors. For the Chinese nonagricultural public sector, we assume
that in the long-run, TFP growth continues to be about zero.
5.2 Projections
The time paths of the projected exogenous variables are fed into the model economy as
follows. The growth rates of zm, za, zg and kg are set to their historical values (see Table
213) from 1978 until 2009. From 2030 until 2050, they are set to the long-run projections
exhibited in Table 4. From 2010 until 2029, they are set to the average of their historical
values and their long-run values. The time path of public employment is given by the
data until 2003 and, in the ﬁrst exercise, it is assumed to remain constant at its 2003
value until 2050. Table 5 reports the results of this exercise for the sectorial allocation of
labor, sectorial output per labor, and total output per labor. The last four results are each
normalized to one in 2005.
Table 5: Projections Exercise #1 – Public employment remains constant
Sectorial Output Total Output
Employment Shares per Labor per Labor
Sector a Sector m Sector g Sector a Sector m Sector g
2005 = 1 2005 = 1 2005 = 1 2005 = 1
2010 0.33 0.39 0.28 1.23 1.70 1.24 1.88
2020 0.26 0.46 0.28 1.46 4.28 2.80 5.36
2030 0.20 0.52 0.28 1.63 10.10 2.57 14.17
2040 0.16 0.56 0.28 1.58 17.26 3.46 25.53
2050 0.14 0.58 0.28 1.57 26.12 4.66 40.04
One can read Table 5 as follows: Under the scenario detailed above, the Chinese total
output per labor would be multiplied by a factor 1.88 between 2005 and 2010. This amounts
to an annual growth rate of 12%, a ﬁgure much higher than the average 5.7% annual growth
in labor productivity observed since 1978. The growth rate of labor productivity declines
in the long run to average 7.6% from 2010 until 2050. The main driver of this labor
productivity expansion is the continued high TFP growth in the private sector. Along
this path, the structural transformation would continue; and the agricultural share of
employment would decline to 14% of the labor force.
Suppose now that the Chinese government reduces public employment gradually to
reach 5% of the labor force by 2050. How would this aﬀect the structural transformation
of the economy? Table 6 reports the results of this experiment. Here, the path of ng is
assumed to equal its current value (about 0.28) until 2009. From 2010 until 2029, it is set
to 0.15 and from 2030 on, it is set to 0.05.
22Table 6: Projections Exercise #2 – Public employment declines
Sectorial Output Total Output
Employment Shares per Labor per Labor
Sector a Sector m Sector g Sector a Sector m Sector g
2005 = 1 2005 = 1 2005 = 1 2005 = 1
2010 0.39 0.46 0.15 1.21 1.58 1.73 2.06
2020 0.31 0.54 0.15 1.43 4.19 2.52 6.21
2030 0.26 0.69 0.05 1.55 9.32 6.47 17.23
2040 0.23 0.72 0.05 1.49 16.03 8.71 31.07
2050 0.23 0.72 0.05 1.47 22.73 11.72 43.72
When public employment is reduced, labor is reallocated to both the agricultural and
nonagricultural sectors. The share of employment in agriculture in 2050 under this new
scenario is 23% (compared with 14% under the previous scenario). Similarly, the share
of nonagricultural employment is higher: 72% vis ` a vis 58%. In terms of overall labor
productivity growth, the two experiments just described hardly diﬀer: The predicted annual
growth rate of total output per labor in the second experiment is 7.6% between 2010 and
2050, as it is in the ﬁrst one.
6 Conclusions
We have shown in the simulations above that our model economy captures the most salient
features of the Chinese economy since the reform period starting in 1978. The model cap-
tures well, the structural transformation of China, the reallocation of labor from agriculture
to nonagriculture, and the patterns of labor productivity growth in the agricultural, pri-
vate, and public sectors. The projection exercises above imply that labor productivity
growth in the private sector–and in the entire economy– will continue to be high in China.
Under the scenario that the employment share of the Chinese public sector continues to
shrink, this dynamic private sector will comprise about 70 percent of total employment by
2030. We project the average growth in total labor productivity to be about 7.6 percent be-
tween 2010 and 2050. Total GDP growth between 2010 and 2050 should average about 7.9
percent annually (7.6 percent growth in output per labor plus 0.3 percent average annual
growth in labor supply).
7 Appendix
Firms
23The ﬁrst order conditions for private ﬁrms imply
















or ka = Σkm where ka = ka/na, km = km/nm and Σ = (1 − α)θ/(αµ). Combine the ﬁrst




















while the ﬁrst order condition with respect to st+1 writes λt = λt+1 (1 + rt+1) where λt is
the Lagrange multiplier associated with the period budget constraint. In the steady state,
this is r = 1/β − 1.
Market for m
Write the budget constraint of a household as
cmt + ptcat + st+1 + τt = wt + (1 + rt)st + Tt
= wtnmt + wtnat + wtngt + (1 + rt)(kmt + kat + qt−1) + Tt − τt
The ﬁrst order conditions of sector m and a together with the market clearing condition
for good a imply
cmt + kt+1 = ymt + ygt + (1 − δ)kt − τt,
in a steady state, this is
cm = (ym − δk) + (yg − δkg). (5)
The right-hand side of (5) is
ym − δk + yg − δkg = zmkα
mnm − δk + yg − δkg.
Write total private capital as k = kmnm + kana or, using the fact that ka = Σkm and the
24equilibrium condition on the labor market, k = km (nm (1 − Σ) + Σ(1 − ng)),thus
ym − δk + yg − δkg = zmkα
mnm − δkm (nm (1 − Σ) + Σ(1 − ng)) + yg − δkg | {z }
G
= nm [zmkα
m − δkm (1 − Σ)] − δkmΣ(1 − ng) + G
In a steady state, km = xz
1/(1−α)
m where x = [((1/β) + δ − 1)/α]
1/(1−α) thus,




m δ (1 − Σ)
i
− xz1/(1−α)












In equilibrium, the ﬁrst element of the expression above is ym−δk which is the consumption
of the private production of m, therefore it is positive. This implies that A > 0. Use again
the fact that nm = 1 − na − ng to obtain
ym − δk + yg − τ = z1/(1−α)
m [(1 − ng)(A − B) − Ana] + G.
Again, consumption of the private production of m is positive in equilibrium, thus A−B >
0. Therefore the right-hand side of (5) is an aﬃne function of na with a negative slope and












































































The coeﬃcient on zm is
ε +
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Figure 2: Prices of Agricultural Goods Relative to Industrial Goods.
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Figure 3: Real Outputs of Agriculture, Private and Public Industries, 1978-2003.
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Figure 5: Capital-Output Ratios for the Economy, and by Sectors, 1978-2003.





































Public Industry/Total Private Industry/Total Agriculture/Total
Figure 6: Investment Shares, 1978-2003.
Figure 7: The Determination of na.
33Figure 8: Eﬀect of an Increase in Agricultural Total Factor Productivity when Goods are
Substitutes.
Figure 9: Eﬀect of an Increase in Nonagricultural Total Factor Productivity when Goods
are Substitutes.
34Figure 10: Eﬀect of an Increase in the Public Production of the Nonagricultural Good.
Figure 11: Employment Share of Agriculture, Chinese Data and Model, 1978–2003.
35Figure 12: Simulated Output per Worker.
Figure 13: Share of Public Investment in Total Investment, Chinese Data and Model,
1978-2002.
36Figure 14: Relative Price of Agriculture, Chinese Data and Model, 1978–2003.
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